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Abstract  
Much research has been conducted in the field of motivated reasoning, with most of this 
work focused on the tendency of motivated reasoners to reject counterarguments out of hand, the 
so-called disconfirmation bias. The objective of this work is markedly different. Borrowing from 
the prodigious body of work on framing, this investigation suggests an alternative route of 
motivated reasoning: when presented with a counterargument, subjects engage in motivated 
reasoning not by wholly rejecting the counter, but by reframing their attitudes so as to reduce the 
importance of the challenged belief. To this end, we conducted a series of experiments centered 
around challenging popular political beliefs and measuring the impact of the challenge on the 
receiver.  
This was accomplished first by conducting surveys to uncover prevailing political beliefs 
around several topics ranging from gun control to the legalization of prostitution. With the most 
common beliefs clearly established, we then conducted an experiment in which these beliefs 
were challenged through the creation of specifically tailored and previously evaluated 
counterarguments. Experimental subjects were asked to provide their (positive or negative) 
attitude toward a given political topic, and then asked to rank and rate the four most common 
beliefs surrounding that topic – with the first ranked belief representing the one the subject felt 
was most important. This belief was then challenged, and after a period – a week in the first trial, 
and ten minutes in the second trial – the subjects were asked to repeat their rankings and ratings 
of the offered beliefs. The results showed virtually no attitude change resulting from these 
challenges, but a significant number of subjects lowered their first-ranked belief after having 
been challenged. We interpret this behavior as engaging in motivated reasoning via reframing. 
Further research to determine when individuals engage in motivated reasoning via 
3 
 
disconfirmation vs. reframing is needed, but these early results suggest that reframing is a 
legitimate alternative route through which individuals maintain their attitudes in the face of 
challenges.  
 
Introduction 
Reasoned argumentation has been a core aspect of political discourse since the time of 
Aristotle. Western society has long prided itself on its rich tradition of rational argument and 
persuasive rhetoric for hundreds of years – indeed, the United States Senate is referred to as the 
greatest deliberative body in the world. But is it true that human beings are so rational, and that 
argumentation is truly persuasive? Research has repeatedly shown that individuals are 
exceedingly unlikely to change an attitude in the face of a challenge (Taber et al., 2006, Kunda, 
1990). This behavior has primarily been attributed to the phenomenon of motivated reasoning –
the tendency of individuals to make decisions and reach conclusions not based on an evenhanded 
analysis of factual evidence, but rather from a desire to conform with currently-held attitudes.  
Most research on political motivated reasoning has focused on one specific pathway – the 
disconfirmation bias (Taber et al. 2006). If a motivated reasoner is displaying this bias, she 
simply dismisses the presented evidence out of hand or seizes upon the slightest flaw to reject the 
evidence if it contradicts her previously held beliefs. Likewise, arguments and evidence that 
confirm previously held beliefs are accepted with little scrutiny. This certainly makes for easy 
cognition, but it is hardly the sole route through which an individual can engage in motivated 
reasoning. In this study we propose an alternative route through which motivated reasoning can 
occur, that of reframing.  
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Reframing, put simply, refers to the cognitive shifting of the lens through which a given 
issue, belief, or attitude object is viewed. When an individual reframes an attitude object, she 
changes the grounds on which she considers it. Quite simply, “a frame defines what an issue is 
about,” (Nelson, 2019). Reframing, then, is the process through which an individual redefines an 
issue by shifting the criteria by which the issue is measured and interpreted.  
It is in this shifting of contexts that the specter of motivated reasoning is raised. We 
present here an alternative route through which motivated reasoning may occur; instead of 
dismissing evidence outright, a motivated reasoner may instead shift her frame. It is easy to 
imagine how this can happen: an individual espouses the view that her support for a 
gubernatorial candidate is predicated on his devotion to Christian morals. Imagine, then, that this 
supporter is presented with evidence that her preferred candidate is not as quite as devout as she 
had originally believed. Rather than rejecting this information out of hand or turning her back on 
her preferred candidate, she can reframe her support – it is not about the candidate’s religious 
convictions, but rather his economic policy. It is this reframing behavior that is the subject of this 
inquiry.  
Literature Review  
 The fields of research in both the areas of framing and motivated reasoning are 
remarkable in their depth and breadth. It is important, however, to review some of the seminal 
texts upon which this investigation is built. In the domain of motivated reasoning we shall review 
the work of Lodge and Taber and Kunda, Likewise, we shall examine the work of Nelson, 
Chong, and Gamson. These authors form the backbone of this inquiry, and each will be paid 
their due.  
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 Any investigation of motivated reasoning would be incomplete without the work of 
Lodge and Taber. First writing on the topic of motivated reasoning in 2006 with their paper 
entitled “Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs,” Lodge and Taber are at 
the forefront of motivated reasoning research. Their work continued in the book The 
Rationalizing Voter, which examined political behavior through a variety of experimental 
paradigms, including motivated reasoning. These two works will serve as the beginning of our 
exploration of motivated reasoning.  
 “Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs” provides a model for how 
average citizens evaluate arguments. Lodge and Taber propose that we are biased processors of 
information – when information supports our previously held positions, we accept it without 
much thought. But when presented information that is contrary to our previously held beliefs, we 
express a higher degree of skepticism, seeking out possible issues and flaws in the information 
that can be leveraged against it (Lodge & Taber, 2006). Taken together, these predispositions 
form the basis of the disconfirmation bias, the most well-known route through which motivated 
reasoning occurs. Lodge and Taber also describe a confirmation bias – a tendency to actively 
seek out information which reinforces currently held beliefs. These biases, working in tandem, 
produce a polarizing effect on attitudes such that attitudes measured at time two are stronger than 
those at time one (Lodge & Taber, 2006). In other words, exposure to a mixed set of evidence 
does not moderate our opinions, as one might expect, but makes them even more extreme. These 
results, which were discovered through a pair of experiments that asked students to evaluate 
contemporary political issues, read over a series of arguments, and then re-evaluate those issues, 
suggest that we are not nearly as fair-minded as we pretend to be – that motivated reasoning has 
an outsized effect on political evaluation.  
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 “Motivated Skepticism” is not Lodge and Taber’s only foray into the realm of motivated 
reasoning. Their book The Rationalizing Voter explores unconscious political thinking and 
political evaluations through a variety of avenues – including motivated reasoning. They begin 
their discussion of motivated reasoning by recapitulating the results described in “Motivated 
Skepticism,” but with a new twist: their motivated reasoning research is used now as a test of 
their John Q. Public (JQP) model (Lodge & Taber, 2013). The JQP model posits that political 
behavior and issue evaluation is nothing more than the end result of the conglomeration of untold 
subconscious processes – that conscious cognition and deliberative thought is just the 
“rationalization of the outputs of automatic affective and cognitive processing,” (Lodge & Taber, 
pg 28, 2013). Put differently, political behavior is not the result of difficult conscious thought, 
but rather the mere expression of a jumble of thoughts and emotions. It is this morass of 
subconscious thoughts and feelings that drives us to engage in motivated reasoning. Lodge and 
Taber are quick to point out their findings on motivated reasoning do not suggest that we are 
consciously deceiving ourselves with hope of protecting previous beliefs, but rather that people 
engage in motivated reasoning unwittingly, driven by a desire to remain consistent with their 
previous positions.  
 Lodge and Taber, giants they may be, are far from the only scholars operating in the area 
of motivated reasoning. We turn now to the work of Kunda whose paper “The Case for 
Motivated Reasoning,” was foundational to this exercise. Kunda, reviewing a vast swathe of the 
research on reasoning, concludes that the existence of “directional” motivated reasoning is 
extraordinarily strong. Motivated reasoning can take two forms: reasoning motivated by 
accuracy, or reasoning driven by directionality. Directionality, in this context, refers to an 
orientation toward a specific goal (Kunda 1990). In other words, when we engage in directional 
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motivated reasoning, we are reasoning in such a way that we strive to reach our desired 
conclusion, not the conclusion which is most accurate. This form of directionally motivated 
reasoning is the subject of this inquiry. According to Kunda, directional motivated reasoning 
operates using entirely different processes from reasoning toward accuracy. These processes are 
dominated and constrained by “motivational biases,” psychological biases which unconsciously 
shape the stream of cognition in such a way that desired conclusion can be reached while a 
veneer of objectivity can be maintained (Kunda 1990). The evidence for this process – which 
Kunda draws from a variety of sources including cognitive dissonance research – suggests that 
these biases shape which memories, beliefs, and even self-characterizations are accessible to the 
reasoner at the time of their reasoning (Kunda 1990).  
 Kunda suggests that this process of drawing upon unconsciously curated cognitive 
resources arises out of the need to create justifications for beliefs – that there are limits to the 
extent to which an individual’s reasoning can be directionally motivated (Kunda 1990). If, for 
instance, an individual has no resources with which she can create a justification for a belief, or 
their resources cannot adequately muster such a justification, directional reasoning will be 
constrained. It seems, then, that there is a limit to motivated reasoning.  
 Here, at the very precipice of motivated reasoning, is an excellent place to pivot our 
discussion to the framing research. We begin with the work of Gamson and Modigliani, 
specifically their paper “The Changing Culture of Affirmative Action.” In “The Changing 
Culture,” Gamson and Modigliani track the changing frames through which the debate on 
affirmative action was viewed. Opponents of affirmative action who once advocated against the 
measure on the grounds that it would be an “undeserved advantage” reframed their opposition to 
a position that there ought to be “no special treatment,” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). The 
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factors behind this reframing are numerous, but Gamson and Modigliani argue that a 
combination of media behavior, resonance with cultural themes, and “sponsor activities” (the 
behavior of those individuals advancing a particular frame) drive this shifting of frames (1989).  
These three factors form the foundation of the authors’ model of public discourse, which argues 
that the life of a frame – its popularity and endurance – is constrained by each factor in turn. In 
other words, frames are not set in stone, and those frames which are no longer viable are cast 
aside in favor of something new.  
 We turn now to the work of Chong and Druckman, who in their “Framing Theory” 
construct not only a definition of framing but an explanation of the effects of framing on public 
opinion (Chong & Druckman 2007). Chong and Druckman masterfully define both framing and 
framing theory, stating “the major premise of framing theory is that an issue can be viewed from 
a variety of perspectives and can be construed as having implications for multiple values or 
considerations. Framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular 
conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue,” (Chong & Druckman, 
2007, p.105). Undergirding this conception of framing is the so-called conventional expectancy 
value model of attitudes, in which an attitude is defined as the sum of all cognitions about an 
attitude object – if an individual has more positive than negative feelings about a given object, 
then she will display a positive attitude toward it (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Everyone has an 
internal logic which governs this calculation, and it is the boundaries of this logic which form his 
“frame in thought” (Chong & Druckman, 2007). For instance, if an individual is developing an 
attitude on a presidential candidate, he may weigh all the positive and negative features of the 
candidate equally – and his frame in thought would thus comprise an amalgamation of all those 
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features. If, however, the individual’s frame in thought elevates a feature of the candidate above 
all others, that feature will be frame through which the candidate is viewed.  
 Frames in thought differ from frames in communication, which refer to the key aspects of 
a given event or object which are emphasized in a message (Chong & Druckman 2007). These 
latter frames are key to understanding the impact of framing on public opinion, as they directly 
shape the attitudes and behaviors of those individuals that receive and adopt them. For frames to 
have an effect, the beliefs upon which the frame is constructed must be available and accessible 
– meaning the given considerations must already exist in an individual’s mind and must be 
retrievable from the depths of memory (Chong & Druckman, 2007). A belief that is both 
available and accessible is then subconsciously judged on its applicability, a measure that arises 
when an individual is sufficiently motivated (Chong & Druckman 2007). Framing effects can 
shape public opinion at each stage of the process – making beliefs available, making them 
accessible, or making them applicable (Chong and Druckman, 2007).  
 We conclude our examination of the current literature in framing with the work of 
Nelson. In his excellent “Emphasis Framing and Political Decision Making,” Nelson describes a 
particular type of frame – an emphasis frame – which manipulates the importance of one aspect 
of an issue or attitude object to place it above all others (Nelson 2019). According to Nelson, 
emphasis frames are everywhere from the desks of journalists and the mouths of politicians to 
the bulletins of social movement groups (2019). Emphasis frames are both frames in 
communication and frames in thought – they manifest in both speech and cognition. As such, 
emphasis frames can have lasting political effects: shifting how an issue is interpreted, adjusting 
the relevance of different aspects of an issue, or opinions about an issue itself (Nelson 2019). 
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Emphasis frames are key pieces of the puzzle of understanding political beliefs, but Nelson 
sagely cautions us: they are not everything.  
 With the literature that was most influential to this exercise now fully reviewed, it is time 
to turn toward our own research. The work of scholars in the field of motivated reasoning tells us 
that individuals resist changing their opinions, and that this resistance often results from an 
unconscious motivation toward consistency with past beliefs. The motivated reasoning research 
tells us that individuals can only engage in motivated reasoning when they can justify their 
resistance to change, and that these justifications must be raised from the depths of memory. 
Until this point, the research on motivated reasoning has focused primarily on disconfirmation. 
But this investigation suggests a new path: reframing. The researchers working in the domain of 
framing tell us that frames shape how an individual thinks about an issue, and that frames can 
change as needed. Frames, it seems, can be conjured from the same depths of memory from 
which justifications can be drawn – even if these frames simply emphasize one aspect of an issue 
above another. Reframing an issue, presents an alternative pathway through which an individual 
may engage in motivated reasoning.  
Hypothesis: 
H1: When confronted with information that conflicts with a currently held belief, individuals 
will reframe the issue in contention so that the challenged belief is no longer emphasized.  
H2: Participants’ attitudes will remain unchanged, even when the beliefs that serve as the 
foundation of those attitudes have been challenged with credible information.  
We conducted two experiments to test our hypothesis. Each experiment consisted of two 
parts. In the first part, participants’ attitudes were assessed, along with the reasons for those 
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attitudes. In the second part, the reason that had been ranked as “most important” in part one was 
challenged with strong, credible information. We then measured participants’ attitudes again 
along with the reasons for that attitude. We predicted that challenged participants would maintain 
the same attitude but reframe the issue by ranking a different reason as “most important” for their 
attitude.  
This investigation comprises two studies. The first study, which occurred in the Fall of 2017 and 
the Fall of 2018, will be discussed here. The second study, which occurred in the Spring and Fall 
of 2019, will be discussed later.  
Study One 
Overview  
 Study One was conducted with the express purpose of measuring the reframing 
performed by subjects whose beliefs were challenged. This study took the form of a two-part 
experiment in which participants were surveyed to obtain their attitudes toward three political 
issues (gun control, capital punishment, and the construction of a wall on the southern border) 
and the most important beliefs (hereby referred to as reasons) undergirding that attitude. 
Participants were then sorted into two groups: an experimental group in which participant 
reasons were challenged by a specifically tailored argument, or a control group in which 
participants were provided with no further information. After receiving either the experimental 
treatment or the control treatment, participants were again asked for their opinions and most 
important reasons. Those individuals whose opinions did not change but whose most important 
reason did were interpreted as having reframed the issue – a statistically significant phenomenon 
in the border wall issue.  
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Methods 
Design/Procedures  
In the fall of 2017, participants were drawn from a pool of Ohio State Political Science 
students. All data was collected by electronic Qualtrics surveys sent via Ohio State email. The 
study began with a pre-test in which a separate sample of respondents from the same population 
were electronically surveyed for their opinions on a number of issues: capital punishment, gun 
control, legal immigration reduction, genetically modified organisms (GMOs), regulation to 
combat climate change, and the building of a wall on the southern U.S. border. Participants were 
asked to choose whether they support or oppose each issue. Those participants who expressed an 
opinion on an issue were asked to provide up to their top three reasons for their position. These 
reasons were then coded by hand into discrete categories, so that similar reasons were lumped 
together. These groups of reasons, then, became the basis of the experiment proper.  
 From the pretest, only the issues of gun control, capital punishment, and the border wall 
were used in the experiment. Once again, participants were drawn from a pool of Ohio State 
Political Science students, and the experiment was conducted electronically in the Fall of 2018. 
As before, all data was collected by electronic Qualtrics surveys sent via Ohio State email. At 
time one (henceforth T1) in the experiment, participants were asked to provide an opinion on 
each of the three issues and then rank four reasons, drawn from the pretest, with respect to their 
importance for their opinion – with the first ranked reason being the most important. Participant 
political knowledge need for cognition, and ideology data was also measured, but do not enter 
the analyses reported here. The bank of reasons which participants were instructed to rank was 
drawn directly from the coded data from the pre-test.  
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 At T2, approximately one week after T1, participants were again surveyed electronically. 
Those participants assigned to the experimental condition for an issue were then presented with a 
brief argument a few sentences in length. Participants were randomly assigned to either an 
experimental or control condition. After receiving either the experimental or control treatments, 
participants were instructed to provide their opinion on each issue, as well as rank the four 
provided reasons, with the first-ranked reason reflecting the reason which participants felt was 
most important. Movement in these rankings – particularly downward movement in the first 
ranked reason – was interpreted as evidence that the first-ranked reason was no longer the most 
important consideration undergirding the participant attitude. Such movement, then, would 
suggest the use of reframing to uphold pre-existing attitudes.   
Experimental treatments 
Participants were randomly assigned to a treatment or control group. In the 
treatment condition, the reason selected as the most important at T1 was 
challenged by a specifically tailored pre-constructed argument generated by the 
investigators. These arguments employed a combination of real and fabricated 
statistics, experts, and studies to ensure the highest possible degree of strength 
was achieved. Example arguments follow. Those participants that were sorted into 
the control treatment received nothing at all – they simply moved along to the 
next survey question.  
  Argument Example 1 
 In response to the provided reason that “the death penalty is a successful 
deterrent of violent crime:” A recent Harvard University study concluded that 
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states with the death penalty have twice the rate of recidivism as those that do not. 
Interviews conducted for the background of this study revealed that many inmates 
did not consider the possibility of the death penalty when considering their 
crimes, and 24% said that they preferred death to life on the streets.  
  Argument Example 2  
In response to the provided reason that “certain classes of firearms should 
be banned from civilian purchase:” A recent study conducted by Everytown for 
Gun Safety concluded that assault weapons are used in less than one percent of 
all crimes, and that legislation centered around these firearms would be largely 
ineffective. The previous Assault Weapons ban of the Clinton administration 
resulted in a 500% increase in the use of these weapons in violent crimes. 
  Argument Example 3 
In response to the provided reason that the “construction of a wall on the 
Southern border of the United States would prevent the smuggling of drugs into 
the country:” A recent report published by the Drug Enforcement Agency 
analyzed the trafficking of drugs in this country and revealed that over 3/4s of the 
drugs currently on the streets originated in the United States. 
Measures  
 The key variables examined in this investigation were: participant opinion, 
participant opinion strength and confidence, and participant reason importance. A 
key effect – treatment impact – was measured as well. Participant opinion in this 
context refers to the attitude expressed by the survey respondents on a given issue 
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area – these expressions took the form of responses to a survey question which 
asked participants if they supported or opposed a given measure. As such, 
participant opinion was measured through these responses, supporting opinions 
were coded as “pro” and opposing opinions were coded as “con,” and a list of pre-
selected possible reasons was provided on this basis.  
The self-reported strength and confidence with which participants held 
their attitudes were measured in an identical manner. Participants were asked to 
rate each independently on a six-point scale, with the lowest end of scale (1) 
corresponding to “not at all strongly,” and “not at all confident,” respectively. The 
highest end of the scale (6) corresponded the greatest degree of strength and 
confidence – “extremely strongly” and “extremely confident,” in turn.  
Each participant, upon expressing an opinion that was either positive or 
negative on a given issue, was then presented with a list of possible reasons for 
this opinion. These reasons were specifically selected from the pre-test data as 
those which were most frequently offered and thus most likely to be applicable to 
the greatest number of participants. Participants were then asked to rank the 
provided reasons from one to four, with the first reason being the statement they 
feel is the most important. This first-ranked reason was then selected to be 
challenged by a specifically tailored counterargument.  
The impact of the argument – the measure we are tracking to see if 
reframing is occurring – is the movement in the first ranked reason from T1 to T2. 
The greater the degree of movement, the greater the perceived reduction in reason 
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importance – in other words, a drop from rank one to rank four is a greater 
reduction in importance than a drop from rank one to rank two.  
Results  
 The first hypothesis guiding this investigation – that individuals presented with 
information that conflicts with their currently held opinions will reframe their conception 
of the issue so that the contested information is no longer important – suggests that we 
should expect the individuals in the treatment condition to engage in motivated reasoning 
through reframing in the face of the provided challenge. We expect that this reframing 
would manifest in the data in the form of movement of the first ranked reason from T1 to 
T2. We predicted greater movement among those in the treatment condition than among 
those in the control group. This reduction in rank corresponds to a shifting of the 
emphasis frame of the issue – the reason which was previously emphasized is no longer 
being emphasized, and thus its rank collapses as a result.  
 As was previously mentioned, this first study covered three issues: gun control, 
capital punishment, and the building of a wall on the southern border. Of these, only the 
wall case produced statistically significant data. As such, the first two cases will not be 
discussed further.  
 Table One: T1-T2 Attitude Stability (Treatment Group) 
Time 1 
Opinion 
Time 2 Opinion 
Favor Oppose Total 
Favor 24 (83%) 5 (17%) 29 (100%) 
Oppose 6 (8%) 69 (92%) 75 (100%) 
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Table Two: T1-T2 Attitude Stability (Control Group) 
Time 1 
Opinion 
Time 2 Opinion 
Favor Oppose Total 
Favor 22 (92%) 2 (8%) 24 (100%) 
Oppose 1 (2%) 79 (98%) 80 (100%) 
 
 In this study, 208 randomly assigned participants were evenly divided between 
the treatment and control groups. In both the treatment and control groups, the majority 
of participants expressed an anti-wall opinion. It is also apparent that the data supports 
hypothesis two – that participant attitudes will not change even if the reasons behind 
those attitudes are challenged. Indeed, in the treatment group 89% of respondents did not 
change their attitudes as a response to the challenge, compared to the 97% of respondents 
in the control group that did not change their attitudes. There is, of course, a difference 
between these groups --there is more stability in the control group than in the treatment 
group, indicating that some participants accepted the challenge and changed their 
attitudes – but the overwhelming majority in each case retained their original attitudes. 
From here we can shift to discuss another novel find in the data – the impact (or lack 
thereof) of the experimental treatment on strength and confidence.  
 
Table Three: Treatment Group Strength and Confidence Change 
Mean value 
Treatment group 
How strong is their opinion? 
(the larger, the stronger)  
How confident do you feel? 
(the larger, the stronger) 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 
Change opinions 2.82 2.1 3.45 2.1 
Remain opinions 4.20 4.13 4.29 4.11 
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Table Four: Control Group Strength and Confidence Change 
Mean value 
Control group 
How strong is their opinion? 
(the larger, the stronger)  
How confident do you feel? 
(the larger, the stronger) 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 
Change opinions 3.33 3.67 3.67 3.33 
Remain opinions 4.32 4.40 4.51 4.51 
  
Interestingly, the treatment condition was found to have no statistically significant 
effect on the strength and confidence variables. This is true both in cases where 
participants maintained their attitude in the face of a challenge and when they changed 
their attitude after the challenge.  As we can see in tables four and five, there is no 
statistically significant difference between the control group and the treatment group in 
either case – the treatment did not have an effect on strength and confidence, regardless 
of attitude change. All the same, it is apparent that the few individuals who did change 
their opinions had expressed less confidence and strength in their opinions at T1 – a 
finding which is especially true of those in the treatment group. It is certainly possible 
that these lower scores help to explain why it is that these individuals changed their 
opinions – they felt less strength and confidence in their orginal opinion, and were more 
likely to simple change their opinion. With this surprising finding documented, we can 
proceed now to our most important finding: the impact of the experimental treatment on 
the ranking of the first-ranked reason.  
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Table Five:  Change in Ranking of First-Ranked Reason, (Treatment vs. Control) 
  
  
Table five shows the degree of change in the rankings of the reasons that had been ranked 
first at T1 for both the treatment and the control group. As a refresher, these first ranked reasons 
are those which the participants identified as the most important reasons undergirding their 
attitude toward a political issue – in this case, the construction of a wall on the southern border – 
at time 1. We hypothesized that this ranking would fluctuate when challenged as the participant 
engages in motivated reasoning – shifting the emphasis frame of the issue so that the first ranked 
reason is no longer the most important. We expected significantly less movement in these first-
ranked reasons within the control group. A Welch two sample T Test (in which the difference 
between the average change in the control and treatment groups is analyzed) revealed a striking 
conclusion: in the case of the construction of a wall on the southern border, the treatment group 
  
Change in Ranking of First-Ranked Reason at T1 (Border Wall) 
  
None 1→ 4 1→ 3 1→ 2 Total Changed 
Condition Treatment 
(N = 84) 
37 
(44%) 
19 11 17 47 
(56%) 
Control 
(N = 96) 
56 
(58%) 
11 8 21 40 
(42%) 
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devalued their first-ranked reasons significantly more than the control group (p = .0155). In other 
words, the movement in rankings in the treatment group is non-random – suggesting that the 
participants were actively reframing their view on the issue of the wall.  
Discussion 
 Study 1 provided evidence consistent with our reframing hypothesis. The 
suggestion that individuals engage in motivated reasoning not only by relying on the 
disconfirmation bias, but by reframing the issue in contention – a conclusion borne out by 
this research – is interesting not only for its implications for political science but for 
society at large.  That participants manipulated their rankings – subconsciously or 
consciously – after having said ranks challenged is a suggestion as to the nature of 
motivated reasoning.  
 The viability of reframing as a means of motivated reasoning is not the only 
discovery unearthed by this study. The experimental data on the measures of strength and 
confidence – which shows that neither was directly affected by a challenge, regardless of 
the shifting in the underlying opinion – is a thought-provoking area for further 
exploration.  Likewise, the discovery that the treatment and control groups were nearly 
equally unlikely to change their opinions was of great interest. This result was directly 
predicted by our second hypothesis, which contends that the participants will not change 
their underlying opinions in the face of a challenge.  
 This study, despite its promising suggestions about reframing as a means of 
motivated reasoning, is not without its limitations. There is, of course, the obvious 
problem that only one out of three issues was able to produce statistically significant data 
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– the explanation for which eludes us even now. It is possible that there is something 
unique about the wall and similar issues that makes it more likely for participants to 
engage in motivated reasoning, but the cause of this discrepancy is still yet unknown. 
Further research in this area – including the second study of this investigation – is needed 
to understand how, why, and when individuals choose to reframe issues to engage in 
motivating reasoning. At minimum, we need to replicate the “wall” findings with another 
issue.   
 There are several other limitations with this study, though none are quite as 
glaring as that which was previously mentioned. There is also the issue of the 
persuasiveness of the provided arguments. The arguments themselves are quite brief – a 
side effect of having to write dozens of them – so their effectiveness at inducing 
motivated reasoning may be hampered for this reason. What we perceive to be a strong 
argument may not actually be perceived as all that strong, further limiting the 
effectiveness of the treatment. It is also quite possible that an argument could be made 
that our experimental treatment does not measure what it purports to measure. It is 
possible that the act of merely asking those participants in the treatment condition to read 
material about a given issue caused them to re-evaluate their reasoning on the issue – 
regardless of the presence of a challenge. Because the participants in the control group 
were not provided any information at all, we have no evidence to refute that claim – a 
limitation addressed in study two. It is also possible that the length of time between T1 
and T2 is simply too great – a week is a long time in the hectic life of a college student.  
 It is for these reasons that we decided to pursue a second study. We took careful 
steps – as will soon be apparent – to ensure that many of the limitations in this study were 
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not repeated. The results of the second study speak for themselves, but this first study 
represents an interesting – and somewhat novel – investigation into motivated reasoning.  
Study 2 
Overview 
The objective of study two, as before in study one, was to attempt to 
uncover the usage of reframing as a form of motivated reasoning on the part of 
research participants that have had an attitude challenged. As before, this was a 
two-part experiment in which participants were asked to identify their attitude 
toward a given issue and choose which reason from a bank of reasons was most 
important to their attitude. After participants had responded to each of the three 
issues, they were then presented with a series of questionnaires that served as 
distractor tasks. Upon completion of the questionnaires, the participants were then 
randomly assigned to two conditions: treatment and control. Those in the 
treatment category received a specifically tailored challenge to their most 
important reason, while those in the control group were simply provided with 
information about the given political issue. The participants were again asked to 
provide their opinion and top-ranked reason for each issue area. Downward 
movement for first-ranked reasons in the treatment group was interpreted by the 
researchers as evidence for reframing.  
Methods 
Design  
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 Much of the design for study two is like study one. The general contours 
of the study – a two-stage study that was electronically delivered – are the same. 
The length of time between T1 and T2 had been drastically shortened, down from 
one week to approximately ten minutes. This was done to reduce the risk of 
participants forgetting their original reason rankings. Otherwise, the experiments 
are much the same.  
 In the Spring of 2019, the investigators conducted a pre-test very similar 
to the one employed in study one. Participants, who were drawn from a body of 
Ohio State political science students, were asked to provide responses on the 
issues of legalized marijuana, legalized prostitution, expanded healthcare access, 
mandatory vaccines, affirmative action, and the so-called Green New Deal. Of 
these, marijuana legalization, prostitution legalization, and affirmative action all 
seemed promising enough to use in the experiment.  
 In a departure from study one, the counterarguments crafted during this 
study – which were specifically tailored to the reasons taken from the pre-test data 
– were assessed for their strength prior to their use in the experiment. This 
assessment in strength came in the form of a pre-test in which participants – 
drawn from a pool of political science students at Ohio State – provided their 
opinion on the issues of marijuana legalization, prostitution legalization, and 
affirmative action.  
 The experiment conducted is, by design, quite like the one conducted in 
study one. The largest difference – aside from the selection of three new issues – 
is the change in the span of time between T1 and T2. Whereas in study one this 
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gap was one week, in study two the gap amounted to the time taken to fill out a 
series of questionnaires that doubled as a distractor task. As before, participants 
drawn from a pool of Ohio State political science students were asked to provide 
their opinion on three issues. Participants could choose to support or oppose a 
given issue, there was no option to express “no opinion”. Once a participant 
expressed an opinion, he or she was then asked to rank four possible reasons, 
drawn from the pretest. Once the reasons had been ranked (with the first-ranked 
reason being the most important to them) participants were then given a series of 
questionnaires to distract them – to take their minds off their previous answers.  
Upon completing the questionnaires, research participants were then given 
either a specifically tailored challenge or given impartial information about the 
issue. Which treatment a participant received was randomly assigned – with the 
treatment group receiving the strength-tested and specifically tailored arguments, 
and the control group receiving the impartial information. This change – in which 
the control group receives neutral information instead of no information at all – 
was made to guard against the possible criticism that someone in the treatment 
condition, having been provided with any information (challenging or otherwise) 
would change his rank order, and thus be falsely perceived as engaging in 
motivated reasoning. Participants in both the challenged and unchallenged 
conditions were then asked to again provide their opinions and rank the given 
reasons.  
Experimental treatments  
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 The experimental conditions in this study were identical to those in the 
first study. Participants were again randomly assigned to either a treatment or 
control condition. In the treatment condition, the reason selected as the most 
important at T1 was challenged by a specifically tailored pre-constructed 
argument, which had been previously tested for strength, generated by the 
investigators. Those participants in the control condition received impartial 
information on the political issue. The arguments presented to the experimental 
group employed a combination of real and fabricated statistics, experts, and 
studies to ensure the highest possible degree of strength was achieved. Example 
arguments follow. 
Example Argument Four 
In response to the claim that “it is safer and easier to legalize prostitution:” 
According to the 2018 FBI crime report, states with lesser penalties for 
prostitution experience significantly higher levels of human trafficking than those 
that stringently regulate prostitution. A 2017 report issued by the United Nations 
Human Rights Council found a similar relationship between decriminalization 
and human trafficking on a global level. Further, this report also concluded that 
legalization is harmful to sex workers, with the majority (68%) reporting that 
relaxing legal regulation resulted in higher disease risk, greater levels of 
violence, and more stress overall. Finally, a comparative study conducted by 
Columbia University revealed that 24% more women self-reported violence in 
legal prostitution area, when compared to areas in which prostitution is illegal.  
Example Argument Five:  
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In response to the claim that “the legalization of prostitution will increase sex 
trafficking:” Officer Keegan O’Reilly, of the Irish Crime Bureau (the Irish 
equivalent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation) recently gave an impassioned 
speech on the topic of sex work to the United Nations Delegation on Women. In 
his speech, O’Reilly spoke at length about the many benefits of the legalization of 
sex work, paying special attention to the many tools this legalization has given 
him to combat human trafficking both at home and abroad. He emphasized that 
the legalization of prostitution in Ireland has been especially effective in 
preventing the trafficking of minors –arrests of child traffickers have more than 
quadrupled.  
 Example Argument Six  
In response to the claim that “Affirmative Action is reverse racism:” Affirmative 
action does not favor people of color over whites but ensures that they are 
considered equally. Even now, white college students are 40% more likely to get 
private scholarships than minorities, and although 62% of college students in 
America are white, these students receive 69% of all private scholarships. 
Someone with a “white sounding” name is 50% more likely to get a job call back 
than a person with an “ethnic” sounding name, according to a 2003 study. 
Caucasians still dominate the best universities, boards of the largest companies, 
the legal profession, the media and politics. White men are significantly more 
likely than other races to occupy senior-management roles in a company. Only 
6.3% of trustees in the largest charities are from black, Asian or minority ethnic 
backgrounds. Affirmative action does not take anything away from anyone. Racial 
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majority groups have systematic advantages in the education and application 
systems. Affirmative action levels the playing field.  
 
Measures  
As before, the key variables examined in this investigation were: 
participant opinion, strength and confidence, and participant reason importance. 
Once again, the key measurement was treatment impact. Participant opinion again 
refers to the attitude expressed by the survey respondents on a given issue area – 
these expressions took the form of responses to a survey question which asked 
participants if they supported or opposed a given measure. Supporting opinions 
were coded as “pro” and opposing opinions were coded as “con,” and a list of pre-
selected possible reasons was provided on this basis.  
Participant strength and confidence was measured by asking participants 
to rate each independently on a six-point scale, with the lowest end of scale (1) 
corresponding to “not at all strongly,” and “not at all confident,” respectively. The 
highest end of the scale (6) corresponded the greatest degree of strength and 
confidence – “extremely strongly” and “extremely confident,” in turn. 
Each participant, upon expressing an opinion that was either positive or 
negative on a given issue, was then presented with a list of possible reasons for 
this opinion. These reasons were specifically selected from the pre-test data as 
those which were most frequently offered and thus most likely to be applicable to 
the greatest number of participants. Participants were then asked to rank the 
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provided reasons from one to four, with the first reason being the statement they 
felt was the most important. This first-ranked reason was then selected to be 
challenged by a specifically tailored challenge.  
The impact of the argument – the variable we are tracking to see if 
reframing is occurring – is the movement in the first ranked reason from T1 to T2. 
The greater the degree of movement, the greater the perceived reduction in reason 
importance – in other words, a drop from rank one to rank four is a greater 
reduction in importance than a drop from rank one to rank two.  
 
Results 
 Once again, the first hypothesis guiding this investigation – that individuals 
presented with information that conflicts with their currently held opinions will reframe 
their conception of the issue so that the contested information is no longer important – 
suggests that we should expect the individuals in the treatment condition to engage in 
motivated reasoning through reframing in the face of the provided challenge. We still 
expect that this reframing would manifest in the data in the form of movement of the first 
ranked reason from T1 to T2, that those individuals that received the experimental 
treatment should, in theory, reduce the ranking of their first ranked reason after being 
challenged. We expect that this movement would be greater in the treatment group than 
in the control group. This reduction in rank once again corresponds to a shifting of the 
emphasis frame of the issue – the reason which was previously emphasized is no longer 
being emphasized, and thus its rank collapses as a result.  
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 Like the first study, this second study also covered three issues– legal marijuana, 
legal prostitution, and affirmative action. Much like the first study, only one case, 
marijuana, produced statistically significant data. Once more, the latter two issues will 
not be discussed further.   
Table Six: Attitude Change for Legalized Marijuana Issue  
  
 Legalization of 
Marijuana 
(Treatment and 
Control), 
N=111) 
(T2) Favor (T2) Oppose 
(T1) Favor 98 (100%) 0 (0%) 
(T1) Oppose 0 (0%) 13 (100%) 
  
 In this study, 111 participants were randomly assigned into either the treatment or 
control group. The treatment group was comprised of 60 individuals, and the control 
group 51.  Table six shows an enlightening discovery – none of the participants in either 
condition changed their original opinions. This is certainly in line of the predictions of 
our second hypothesis, which holds that participants will not change their underlying 
opinions in the face of a credible challenge. We turn now to the most striking finding in 
this second study – the impact of the treatment on the first-ranked reasons.  
 
Table Seven: Change in Ranking of First-Ranked Reason, (Treatment vs. Control)  
30 
 
  
 
 Table seven shows the amount of change in the 1st-ranked reason from T1 to T2, 
for the control and treatment groups. The greater the drop, the more the emphasis has 
shifted away from the attacked reason. As predicted, the treatment group showed greater 
movement than the control group. This discovery was found to be statistically significant 
with a p-value of 0.0. Larger movement, in this context, directly corresponds to a greater 
drop in the rankings for the first ranked reason – meaning that the treatment group 
devalued their first ranked reason more than the control group. This devaluation in the 
first ranked reason is direct evidence in the support of our hypothesis, and direct evidence 
that reframing is an alternative method of motivated reasoning.   
Discussion  
 This study now provides us with a second piece of evidence that reframing serves 
as a valid alternative pathway for individuals engaging in motivated reasoning – this 
time, for an entirely different issue (legalizing marijuana). Individuals in the treatment 
  
Change in Ranking of First-Ranked Reason at T1 (Marijuana) 
  
None 1→ 4 1→ 3 1→ 2 Total 
Changed 
Condition Treatment 
(N = 60) 
29 
(48%) 
13 10 8 31 
(52%) 
Control 
(N = 51) 
39 
(76%) 
6 3 3 12 
(24%) 
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condition engage in a shifting of emphasis frames that is measurable in the data. This 
shift, which is represented in the data as a lowered ranking of the first-ranked reason, 
provides us with strong evidence that participants are reframing their attitudes so that the 
attacked reason is no longer emphasized. This shifting in emphasis allows the participants 
to preserve their core attitude – a classic case of directionally motivated reasoning.  
 This study also explores the durability of attitudes in the face of challenges. As 
was the case in study one, those participants that had their reasons challenged did not 
change their opinions – their core attitudes were unaffected by the attack on their most 
important reasons. In this study this conclusion is made more convincing by the fact that 
none of the participants changed their underlying opinions. The fact that no one in either 
the treatment or control group changed their opinion is striking. While it is certainly 
possible that some aspect of the experimental design – the short time interval between T1 
and T2 seems a likely suspect – could be driving this peculiar data point, but the data 
nevertheless reveals that participants in the treatment group did not change their attitudes 
in the face of a strong challenge.   
 This finding is striking because it again adds to the ever-growing body of research 
on the topic of motivated reasoning – stretching the discipline to include new and novel 
considerations. This study builds on the work of study one and adds further evidence to 
the claim that reframing serves as a valid alternative method of motivated reasoning. Like 
study one before it, this study is not without its own problems. Again, only one of three 
issue areas produced a significant change in rankings, raising further questions about 
when and where reframing will occur. Another study with a larger sample size comprised 
of the general public would likely yield more interesting data. It is certainly possible that 
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a larger sample size would produce statistically significant data for some or all the other 
issue areas. It is also certainly possible that a study of the general public would reveal 
more data about the nature of reframing as a method of motivated reasoning – college 
students are homogeneous in their education levels – but it is important to note that there 
is nothing unique about college students in their capacity for motivated reasoning – 
everyone engages in it.  
Conclusion 
 The conclusion of studies one and two leaves us at in an exciting place. We have solid, 
statistically significant data that suggests that reframing is an alternative method of motivated 
reasoning, but this conclusion is only true in two out of six cases. Similarly, we have data 
suggesting that participant opinions are resistant to change in the face of attacks on the reasons 
undergirding those opinions.  
 It is undeniable that reframing is a method of motivated reasoning. The data is clear on 
this point – and we have conducted two studies to support it. Each of these studies compared a 
treatment group in which the researchers attempted to induce motivated reasoning by challenging 
an important reason – a key belief underlying a political opinion – against a control group in 
which no challenge was given. In each study, the treatment group (for at least one issue area per 
study) produced a greater reduction in the ranking of their previously first-ranked reason than 
that which was seen in the control group. This devaluation in the ranking of the first-ranked 
reason in the treatment group seems to suggest a shifting of the emphasis thought frame in the 
mind of the participant. This shifting of the frame – in which a frame which was once considered 
important is now suddenly made unimportant – allows the participant to preserve her original 
political opinion in an unchanged form. This cognitive maneuver to maintain an opinion in the 
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face of a strong challenge is a textbook example of motivated reasoning, just in a form which has 
not been previously discussed.  
 For all the new ground that this investigation has covered, it is not without its drawbacks. 
The first and most glaring is that reframing has only been identified in 33% of the cases in which 
it has been tried. The factors underlying this unequal expression are not yet understood. It is not 
unlikely that some of blame for this peculiarity can be laid at the feet of the design of this 
experiment. Perhaps the challenges themselves were not sufficiently strong to arouse much 
motivated reasoning, or perhaps the challenges were more likely to elicit a disconfirmation bias 
response than a reframing response. Perhaps the sample sizes were too small, or the population 
from which the participants were drawn was unique in some way. All these possibilities present a 
great many avenues for exploration – but also point to limitations in this study. More participants 
and participants drawn from a broader swathe of the general public would both produce a more 
robust (and more representative) view of the potential of reframing to engage in motivated 
reasoning.  
The counterarguments used in this study are relatively short and relatively shallow.  
Perhaps a better experiment would craft longer arguments that are more thoroughly developed 
but doing so also opens the door for more opportunities for participants to identify perceived 
flaws in the arguments and dismiss them out of hand. Better yet would be an experiment that 
forgoes the pre-tested bank of responses altogether, one that crafts a unique response to each 
participant’s own most important reason. Such a program is certainly possible, but it is far 
beyond the capacity of this endeavor. An area of exploration which was briefly raised during this 
investigation – though never implemented in an experiment proper – is the usage of different 
types of arguments to challenge the participants. Rather than focusing solely on the sort of dry, 
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logical arguments offered in this investigation, perhaps one which relied on more emotional 
arguments may produce different or more robust results.  
It is also possible that we have not yet struck the perfect balance of time between T1 and 
T2. A week may have been too long, and ten minutes too short. The temporal dimensions of 
reframing as a method of motivated reasoning are entirely unexplored – it is certainly possible 
that an interval well between those used here would produce better results than ours. At present 
such effects are entirely unknown.  
So where do we go from here? This fusion of reframing and motivated reasoning is 
utterly unique in political psychology, meaning that a great many horizons of inquiry await those 
investigators who continue where we left off. Some of these horizons have been mentioned 
already – crafting larger and more representative experiments, introducing new styles of 
argumentation, or playing with the length of time between T1 and T2 – but the most fruitful and 
most challenging areas of inquiry are related to the mysterious nature of reframing as a method 
of motivated reasoning. Why is it that only some participants seem to engage in this form of 
motivated reasoning? Why is it that only two of the six issues explored produced good data? 
Examinations of moderating variables conducted by the research team produced little of note – 
these questions remain as baffling to us as the day they were raised. It is these two areas that 
suggest the greatest promise. It has been said that motivated reasoning has a limit (Kunda 1990). 
Is there a limit to reframing as motivated reasoning? Further, when does an individual engage in 
reframing over disconfirmation bias? Are our participants even aware that they are engaging in 
this form of emphasis reframing? This new fusion of the bodies of research in motivated 
reasoning and reframing has brought us to a new frontier of political psychology, but questions 
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abound. We hope that these questions can be answered, and that the kinks in our research design 
can be worked out.  
The impact of this new form of motivated reasoning on the broader public is vast. Our 
new research suggests yet again that we, as Homo sapiens, are not terribly good at changing our 
minds. This has broad implications for nearly every facet of human life – our private, public, and 
political lives all rely on our ability to persuade each other. This new research suggests that this 
persuasion is even more difficult than we had previously assumed – we are far less likely to 
change our attitudes in the face of a challenge than we are to engage in some cognitive sleight of 
hand to ensure that our original attitudes are preserved. Perhaps most striking is the fact that it is 
not at all clear as to what degree the participants are aware that they have engaged in emphasis 
reframing. If so much of defensive cognitive behavior occurs beneath the conscious level, the 
task of persuading our friends, coworkers, and loved ones becomes all the more difficult. 
Whatever the broader implications of this investigation may be, it is now exceedingly clear that 
in the realm of motivated reasoning, reframing is the same devil – just wearing a brand-new 
dress.  
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